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NO-FAULT AND THE COURTS
by

BENJAMIN S. MACKOFF*

The wide appeal of no-fault insurance legislation is inspired
by the belief on the part of the general public that, in some extraordinary way, its adoption will relieve a wide variety of social
ailments. Not only will no-fault finally provide automobile accident victims with timely and adequate compensation, but such
benefits will be possible at a reduced premium. By providing
first-party benefits on a no-fault basis, time-consuming disputes
over liability will be obviated. The resulting reduction of the
need to pursue relief by filing a lawsuit, will relieve much of the
congestion in our nation's courts.
Whether no-fault is as miraculous a panacea as its promoters tell us remains to be seen. While it may be difficult to predict
with accuracy the impact of such legislation on compensation and
insurance costs, some rather "safe" predictions may be made
regarding the impact of no-fault on the courts. To the extent
that a particular no-fault scheme precludes or limits access to
the courts for the recovery of losses arising out of automobile
accidents, the volume of litigation in that jurisdiction will be
proportionately reduced. To the extent that such plans remove
accident claims from the courts, so also will the shocking number
of abuses generated by the fault system be mitigated. The impact of no-fault automobile insurance legislation on the courts
will be analyzed in terms of the traditional "fault system" it
seeks to reform and the specific provisions of the major no-fault
plans proposed to date.
Historically, courts have provided the only available forum
for the recovery of damages in automobile accident cases. But
unless a claimant could prove an alleged wrongdoer at fault,
there was no possibility of recovery. Fault was measured by
reference to a standard of negligence used to determine liability
in horse and buggy days. The driver had a duty to operate his
vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner. Failure to do so
gave the injured party a right to recover in tort for damages
against the driver. While a few jurisdictions experimented with
alternate forums for determining liability, such as arbitration
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panels, none abandoned the notion of fault. These schemes not
only retained fault as a prerequisite to recovery, but also permitted access to the courts on appeal to assure that the standard
was correctly applied. Fault was held to be so basic to our
system of justice that only a court could be trusted ultimately
with such a determination.
The advent of the automobile posed no immediate difficulties
for courts. As a matter of convenience, traditional rules of negligence were applied to accident cases involving automobiles just
as they had been applied to horses and hansom cabs. But the
greater volume of litigation soon made it apparent that accommodating the automobile to the traditional fault system was not
quite as simple as it had seemed at first. The automobile was a
very much more complex phenomenon which presented new difficulties for the determination of fault and the assessment of
damages. Automobiles, by their very nature, were harder to
control through the driver's own attentiveness. Further, defective design, irregular maintenance, poorly planned highways and
lack of traffic signals contributed as much to causing automobile
accidents as simple negligent driving. Moreover, the automobile,
unlike the horse and buggy, possessed a tremendous potential for
destructiveness. Few individual car owners felt confident of
their own ability to bear the financial burden of accidents that
statistically would involve nearly all drivers within their lifetimes. As a consequence, most drivers turned to some form of
insurance to help them shoulder the financial risk of driving.
Insurance carriers soon became the real party at interest in a
majority of the automobile accident cases. This development
weakened one of the basic tenets of the fault system: namely,
that by forcing the wrongdoer to pay for his negligence, the fault
system was a deterrent to bad driving.
While some types of insurance coverage - medical, collision
and comprehensive health benefits were always on a no-fault
basis, recovery for the more substantial bodily injury and property damage was anchored to the third party, fault system.
Recovery was not simply a matter to be resolved by applying
the terms of the insurance contract; it required proof of liability
of the third party satisfactory to a court of law in all but the
cases where liability was undisputed. Even where liability was
undisputed, the damage question was left to judicial determination. Furthermore, for financial reasons, it was more practical
for insurers to leave both the liability and the damage questions
to the courts in all but the most obvious cases.
While the volume of litigation generated by the fault sys-
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tern was manageable, the system remained unassailed. Courts
were able to accommodate automobile accident cases while providing adequate and speedy justice in other areas of the law.
But as more and more automobiles crowded the highways,' it
was inevitable that there would be a substantial increase in the
number of accidents with a corresponding increase in automobile
accident claims. Soon thereafter, improved methods of reporting court statistics revealed to the general public what judges,
court administrators, lawyers, insurers and countless accident
victims already knew - namely, that the nation's courts were
deluged with automobile accident litigation.
The greater volume of cases placed new pressure on procedures, facilities and personnel accustomed to a slower pace of
litigation. Lengthy pre-trial discovery, protracted negotiation
and the time-consuming jury selection process contributed to
delays even before the case was assigned to a judge. By the
mid-1960's, the delay for litigants seeking trial in metropolitan
courts was measured in years.2 Expanded trial facilities, more
judges and streamlined procedures enabled a few of the more
flexible court systems to keep up with the rising tide of accident
litigation. Other court systems, unable to add judicial manpower
to meet the greater volume of litigation, simply shifted judges to
personal injury calendars. This was usually accomplished at the
expense of other critical areas of litigation, such as criminal or
juvenile, matters less amenable to delay in the judgment of the
public as well as the professionals.
Some jurisdictions were without even the most basic tools
necessary to reduce mounting backlogs. Court appropriations,
normally a neglected item, were subordinated to other pressing
needs in the formulation of state and local government budgets.
In most cases, the forthcoming allocations were insufficient to
allow the judiciary to respond to the backlog problem with modern management tools, such as communications systems and
data processing, among others. Budget requests of several trial
court systems were severely reduced by approving bodies.3 In
1 117 CONG. REC. §1835 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971).

The Federal Highway

Administration estimated that by 1970 there were 11,491,705 registered
motor vehicles in the United States. The 1970 figure represented an increase
of approximately 65 per cent from 1960. 1971 U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU,
2 117 CONG.

1971 POCKET DATA BOOK 280.

REC. §1839 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970). The average delay
in settling claims over $2,500 is 19 months. In many cities it takes more
than two years for trial of a civil suit. The backlog, or the waiting time for
trial is variously calculated from the date of filing the complaint itself, the
date of the answer or the date when all parties indicate their readiness to go
to trial. The "backlog" is often a misleading statistic since it does not take
into consideration the overwhelming majority of cases which are terminated
prior to trial.
3 36 BROOKLYN L. REv. 342, 354, n. 15 (1970).
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certain jurisdictions, 4 the issue of whether the appropriating
body had the authority to deny reasonable requests for funds
from courts raised serious questions regarding separation of
powers. 5
The inability of the courts to deal with the greater volume
of litigation in an expeditious way created not only new delays,
but embarrassing abuses of the judicial process which undermined public confidence in the legal system. Delay was fast
becoming an embarrassing contradiction to our entire notion of
justice.
Delay, seemingly inherent to the litigation process, spawned
new abuses unique to the personal injury business. The expense of defending suits over a protracted period made it practical for insurance companies to settle so-called "nuisance claims"
where the injuries were minor and the liability dubious. Overpublicized big verdicts encouraged the pursuit of questionable
claims where injuries were serious. A litigation-conscious public
with exaggerated expectations was easy prey for the unscrupulous attorney adept at building a case.
Undeterred by canons of professional ethics, lawyers solicited cases either personally or through agents popularly known
as "ambulance chasers." They signed up accident victims by
promising fantastic sums even while the would-be client was
stretched out on the street or en route to emergency treatment.
These same lawyers induced police officers and firemen, often the
first ones to arrive at the scene of the accident, to direct them
to the victim for a fee and even color their testimony if it became necessary. "Ambulance chasers" induced some clients and
doctors to exaggerate injuries and inflate, or approve inflated
bills. Accidents were contrived and injuries were fabricated
to defraud the unwary insurance company or the unsuspecting
defendant.
In the opinion of many observers, ambulance chasing and
related corruptions of the plaintiff's bar were linked to the
"contingent fee." Under that system, the victim's lawyer was
paid a fee contingent on the amount of money recovered in the
case. In certain instances, the plaintiff's attorney supported the
accident victim pending settlement of the suit, a practice clearly
4

d. at 353.
5 In Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971), the right of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas to mandamus funds was upheld where
the items requested were reasonable. The case had dual significance for
court administration: (1) The Judiciary has inherent power to determine
what funds are reasonably necessary for its efficient operation and (2) it has
the power to compel the executive and legislative branches to provide these
funds after the reasonable request has been reduced or eliminated.
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in violation of the canons of professional ethics. This discriminated in favor of the lawyers who were able to finance their
clients. When an award was forthcoming, the lawyer extracted
his fee before any compensation was paid to the victim. That
6
fee averaged about 33 per cent of the award nationally.
The personal injury lawyers, who had sound economic reasons for controlling as many of these cases as possible, did not
desire an early disposition. If he accumulated a certain number
of dispositions, his fees might be greatly diminished by income
taxes. Also, the prudent lawyer always wanted an inventory
of pending cases for the proverbial rainy day.
Just as the plaintiff with a questionable claim had no reason
to hasten the day of reckoning, the culpable defendant counted
delay as one of his tools to defer the judgment cost. Frequently,
the actual defendant was the insurance company - through a
subrogation or indemnification contract in the insurance policy.
Delay permitted postponement of claim payments and building
interest on reserves.
In some instances, defendants in personal injury cases found
themselves liable personally, despite the fact that they carried
insurance. Resourceful but unscrupulous investors, eyeing large
sums spent each year on casualty insurance premiums, organized
insurance companies for the sole purpose of paying themselves
high salaries while contesting claims, so as to milk the company
until it was insolvent. Instead of being insured against a claim,
defendant was obliged to pay the judgment out of his own pocket,
or even be assessed an additional one year's premium to pay for
claims against others defrauded by the same insurer. Even if
the severely injured plaintiff were finally awarded an adequate
judgment, he now discovered that it was worthless, since the
uninsured defendant had insufficient funds to pay even a portion
of the judgment.
The list of abuses that grew up with the fault system was
legion, but the more agonizing fact was that the quality of justice
rendered to the public was disappointing. As President Nixon
pointed out in his speech before the National Conference on the
Judiciary convened at Williamsburg, Virginia: "Justice delayed is
not only justice denied - it is also justice circumvented, justice
mocked and the system of justice undermined. ' IT By the time
a case finally went to trial, the delay of up to several years caused
a deterioration of evidence, lapsed memories and contributed to
6 J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY
7

37 (1971).

Wall Street Journal, Apr. 21, 1971 at 22, col. 1.
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the unavailability of witnesses. Brittle legal rules, such as the
rule of contributory negligence which required the successful
plaintiff to prove the wrongdoer's negligence as well as his own
freedom from contributory negligence, made proof under tricky
rules of evidence, time-consuming and complex. Other than
courts prodding lawyers to reach a speedy disposition, there was
generally no real effort by any of the participants to speed justice
along because there were no real incentives offered by the system. Some courts even refused to hurry matters along, preferring to wait until the lawyers indicated their readiness to proceed
to trial.
Furthermore, the social costs of maintaining such a system
were great not only to the uncompensated victim but the general
public as well. That system not only fostered corruption and
abuse in the administration of an often questionable brand of
justice, but it did a shockingly inadequate job of fulfilling its
principle purpose - compensating the victim.
Various studies sketched the pattern of gross overpayment
of small claims and underpayment of large ones. The United
States Department of Transportation's study revealed that sixty
per cent of those who suffered more than $10,000 in measurable
economic loss received nothing in fault claims. Thirty per cent
of that number received less than fifty per cent of their measurable economic loss. In contrast, none of those victims with
less than $1,000 in economic loss received less than half their
losses. Fourteen per cent of that number received four times
their loss.8 Even more startling was the report of the American
Insurance Association that victims with under $100 of economic
loss who retained a lawyer received an average of seven times
their economic losses." The fault system was simply failing to
provide equitable compensation for automobile accident victims.
Just as the costs of premiums for the automobile owner
were high, so were the costs of court administration to the taxpayer. While it is difficult to assign with precision a price for
maintaining the courts for auto claims purposes, it has been
estimated that it costs $250 per hour to try a jury case before
adding attorneys' fees and other legal expenses. That cost is
hardly less for non-jury time. If one considers that many courts
throughout the country assign a substantial portion of their trial
s United States Department of Transportation, Economic Consequences
of Automobile Accident Injuries, Report of the Westat Corporation, vol. 1,
table 25fs, p. 235.
9 Am. Ins. Assn., Report of the Special Committee to Study and Evaluate the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan and Automobile Accident
Reparation, Exhibit X (1968).
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bench to the processing of automobile accident cases, one may
appreciate the handsome contribution which the taxpayer makes.
And what does the taxpayer get in return for his tax dollar?
Certainly not an orderly and effective litigation of actual disputes. It is a rather distressing symptom of the abuses now
ensnarling the courts that a very low ratio of cases is actually
decided by a trial of the issues. In some courts that ratio is as
low as two or three per cent. This means that the court is being
used merely as a forum for the claims adjusting bargaining
process. The judge becomes an umpire between two parties who
do not really seek a determination of the legal matters involved.
There is little question but that the taxpayer is subsidizing insurance companies to negotiate its own claims within public
facilities and on judge time.
All this occurs at a time when new and important matters
are being thrust upon the courts for decision. Expanding constitutional requirements of due process have added new aspects
to criminal proceedings and demand a more formal trial in
juvenile cases. Third party and class actions are now commonplace in many areas of civil litigation. New remedies available
for consumer and environmental protection, as well as for welfare recipients and apartment dwellers, represent new demands
on court time.
If so many of the inefficiencies and inequities of the present
fault system could be traced to reliance on the courts for the
settlement of disputed claims, then the solution is to remove the
question of liability in automobile accident litigation from the
courts. This would leave only the extent of damages for the
courts to determine. Many states have attempted to do just this
by the introduction of no-fault insurance plans.
What follows is a brief review of the major no-fault legislation both proposed and in effect. They are discussed with a
view toward their projected impact on the courts of this nation
and assessed in terms of their probable success in ameliorating
the persistent problems of court congestion and abuses of the
judicial process. The ability of individual plans to provide adequate and timely compensation, as well as reduce mounting
insurance costs is a question that is better left to the expertise of
others. This is not to say, however, that the compensation and
cost problems, while basically economic in nature, do not have
an influence on the administration of justice in a significant but
albeit indirect way.
State no-fault plans are best treated in the chronological
order of their introduction; each successive plan was built on the
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basic theory constructed by Professors Keeton and O'Connell
in 1965.10 The original Keeton-O'Connell Plan provided complete reimbursement of the accident victim on a no-fault basis up
to a certain specified amount. In the original plan that amount
was $10,000.
As adopted in Massachusetts under that State's Personal
Injury Protection Plan, that threshold amount was $2,000. That
is, a total of up to $2,000 is payable in an injury case for reimbursement of medical expenses and loss of income, regardless of
fault." If medical expenses stay under $500, there is no legal
recourse for pain and suffering unless one of a specified set of
injuries has occurred. This feature was recently upheld by the
2
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Pinnick v. Cleary.'
Payment for pain and suffering could be recovered by suit where
legal liability was established in court against another person for
his negligence. Medical and wage loss payments over $2,000
also remained under negligence law.
While the Massachusetts bill was a definite improvement
over the present fault system, its impact was severely mitigated
because the right to pursue fault claims was preserved for so
many cases. The danger, according to Professor O'Connell, was:
...that sooner or later, they will increase [the number of fault
claims] to the point where we will approach that perilous situation of having both fault and no fault applicable to the greater
mass of smaller and medium-sized claims, with
the corresponding
3
risks of corruption and skyrocketing costs.'
The $500 Massachusetts threshold can be easily reached at
today's high medical costs by merely placing the claimant in the
hospital for a few days and running him through a battery of
tests. The Massachusetts experience in its first year of operation, however, has been hopeful in spite of its limitations. The
Commissioner of Insurance in that State reported a drastic re14
reduction in the filings of personal injury claims.
The National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII)
Plan retains the present liability system, except that it permits first-party payments of the first $2,000 of medical payments
and the first $6,000 of lost wages?5 If negligence is a factor in
an automobile accident, subrogation is available to the company
10R.
VICTIM
11

KEETON

&

J.

O'CONNELL,

MASSACHUSETTS STATUTES OF

12271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
13THE INJURY INDUSTRY, note 6
14 Id. at 120.
15 No-FAULT: MORE QUESTIONS

(1971).
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PROTECTION
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making payments. A claimant who receives first-party payments, were he also to recover from the wrongdoer by suit, would
have the amount of the "quick no-fault payment" deducted from
such a recovery. Recoveries for pain and suffering are permitted
if the other party is at fault, but the amount of such recoveries is
limited to a percentage of medical bills.
The American Insurance Association (AIA) Plan eliminates recourse to the current legal liability system entirely, and
as such, promises to have the most salutory effect on the problem
of court congestion. Insurance coverage is compulsory for measurable economic loss arising out of personal injury, death, or
damage to property (other than vehicles). In addition, coverage
under this plan includes payments for all loss of earnings and
establishes a maximum amount for pain and suffering.
The Hart-Magnuson Bill (S.945) is a compulsory Federal
plan requiring minimum state standards for compensation of
persons injured in an automobile accident for all medical expenses attributable to that accident. The original, proposal introduced in February, 1970, was extensively revised following
ten days of hearings before the Senate Sub-committee on AntiTrust and Monopoly last spring. Subject to revisions, every
single automobile owned would be required to purchase a basic
policy covering his own losses and those of any other driver or
passenger in his vehicle as well as those of any pedestrian injured by his vehicle. Moreover, every insurance company would
be required to insure any licensed driver who applied unless he
failed to pay premiums or had his license revoked. The basic
policy would pay the medical and rehabilitation costs of the
driver, his family, his passengers, and his victims other than
occupants of the other car, who would receive payments from
the other driver's insurance. All lost wages up to $1,000 a
month would be paid until the injured person could return to
work. Household services which the victim would have performed
were he not injured would also be paid up to a certain limit.
Property damage to all but another vehicle in use is included on
a first-party basis. Pain and suffering losses suffered by an occupant of the policy-holder's vehicle or a pedestrian struck by it
would be paid if that person were not the owner of a vehicle or a
member of the owner's family. Optional third-party coverage
permits suit for recovery of pain and suffering according to existing state law, if the victim does not feel he has been adequately compensated by his own insurer. Such suits, however,
could not be filed until after payment for net economic losses had
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been completed, or three years after the injury, whichever occurred first.
Somewhat similar to the Hart-Magnuson Plan is the recent
draft bill produced by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. The measure would provide first-party,
no-fault benefits, including all medical rehabilitation expenses
and up to $1,000 per month in lost wages. The proposed bill
permits suit if the victim suffered permanent significant loss of
body function, including death, permanent serious disfigurement,
or an injury resulting in medical expenses exceeding an as yet
unagreed upon amount.
The Illinois Extended Personal Injury Protection Plan 6
was to become effective January 1, 1972, but its implementation
was enjoined by an adverse ruling in the Circuit Court of Cook
County which was upheld on review.17 The Illinois Plan was to
have applied to insurance for private passenger automobiles and
certain light utility vehicles. 8 This classification was held to be
special legislation under Article IV, Section 13 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, and therefore void.
The compensation provisions of the Illinois Act provided
for the payment of all reasonable medical expenses up to $2,000,
the payment of 85% of all uncompensated lost wages up to $150
per week or a maximum of $7,800, and for loss of services at a
rate of $12 per day for one year.'9 The trial court held this
section invalid because the general damages recoverable by an
injured party were based solely upon his expenses for medical
services. The court found that substantial differences existed
between the cost of medical services provided for the poor and
for the wealthy, and also between different geographical areas
of the State.
The plan offered no compensation for pain and suffering,
although in damage suits based on tort liability brought to recover sums in excess of $2,000, recovery was available for pain
and suffering, but limited to one-half the amount of the medical
expenses up to $500 and an amount equal to the actual medical
expenses above $500. Recovery in such suits was subject to
being reduced by the amount paid to the victim by his own insurance company.
The arbitration provisions of the Illinois Act were of special
interest to the reviewing court. Section 609 provided for com8

1 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §1065.150-163 (1971).
1 Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).

Is See note 16 supra.
19 Id.
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pulsory arbitration of claims in counties with a population in
excess of 200,000 persons, where the amount involved was $3,000
or less. The question of whether such a requirement violated the
right to trial by jury was raised but not resolved by the Illinois
Supreme Court. However, this provision was found to violate
Section 9 of Article VI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution which
has been interpreted to prohibit trials de novo, and Section 14
of Article VI which outlawed fee officers in the judicial system.
Although the Illinois No-Fault Act has been declared unconstitutional, Illinois insurers continue to honor their obligations under the quick payment provisions. The rationale for
such a course of action is that the no-fault policy is simply a
private contact which requires no legislation to effectuate. At
present, there still remains complete access to the courts for any
type of claim and neither the arbitration provisions nor the limitation on pain and suffering recovery are in effect. Illinois legislators are currently drafting a new bill designed to cure the constitutional defects of the original measure.
Several other states have turned to variants of the no-fault
concept recently. Florida has enacted the Automobile Reparation Reform Act, effective January 1, 1972.20 It is somewhat
more extensive than the Massachusetts Plan in that it provides
a higher threshold of no-fault benefits ($5,000) and eliminates
fault claims for pain and suffering unless medical bills exceed
$1,000, and there is a no-fault provision for property damage.
Delaware has recently enacted a no-fault law providing for
$10,000 in first-party benefits, but retaining recourse to the
courts for recovery of pain and suffering losses.21 Oregon's new
law22 provides no-fault benefits of $3,000 for medical bills and
$6,000 for wage loss, without abolishing fault claims for pain
and suffering. Recently, Connecticut 2 3 and New Jersey 24 have
passed no-fault laws expected to become operational January 1,
1973. The Connecticut law is nearly identical with the Massachusetts Plan, while the New Jersey law is a weaker version
carrying a $200 threshold amount.
From an overall view of the major trends in so-called nofault plans, alternative prototypes emerge: The "pure" no-fault,
represented by the AIA Plan; the "modified" nb-fault exemplified
by the Illinois, and to a lesser extent the Massachusetts, Florida,
20 O'Connell, The Injury Industry at 121, note.
5, 1970 at 14, col. 3.
21

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANNOT. ch. 90, §34a (1970).

22

ORE. LAWS ch. 523 (1971).

23
24

Chicago Tribune, Oct.

P.A. 273 (1972). (4 Conn. Leg. Serv. at 567-80 (1972).
N.J. LAWS ch. 70 (1972).
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Delaware, Oregon, Connecticut and New Jersey Plans. One of
the more significant factors insofar as the impact of these plans
on the courts is the manner in which pain and suffering is handled. To the extent that recourse to the fault system for the
recovery of pain and suffering losses is precluded, the introduction of no-fault legislation will substantially reduce the volume
of automobile accident litigation. This is particularly true in
those areas where measurable economic loss is negligible but
where claims are inflated on the basis of subjective symptoms
whose worth is determined by the sheerest of speculations. Under the "pure" no-fault prototype, there is no compensation for
such intangible injuries and there can be no recovery by way of
a suit for damages. Opponents of no-fault have criticized this
aspect of the AIA and the Keeton-O'Connell Plan as being not
only inequitable but unconstitutional. The inequity is that the
victim may be unable to collect for disabilities which may recur
long after he leaves the hospital and returns to work as well as
for the anguish and hardship which accompany the injuries. The
constitutional argument is that by denying victims recourse to
the courts they are being deprived of a vested property right, the
right to full recovery in tort. But since most claims are paid
for minor injuries rather than to the seriously hurt, the elimination of the lawsuit for pain and suffering will have the effect
of holding many claims within the limits set for first-party recovery on a no-fault loss.
The personal injury plaintiff's bar urges that limitation on
the recovery of pain and suffering will force many lawyers to
refuse cases unless paid in advance, which most clients are unable
to do. But the answer to this is that the elimination of petty
claims for pain and suffering may allow insurance companies to
pay, on a no-fault basis and in addition to out-of-pocket losses,
at least some compensation to the permanently disabled. If,
however, this type of coverage proves too expensive, there is a
strong argument in favor of preserving the right to sue. A
sensible compromise embodied in the various "modified no-fault"
plans is to eliminate the pain and suffering claim for the smaller
suits as measured by the dollar amount of medical expenses and
allow recourse to the courts to recover for pain and suffering,
limiting that jecovery to a percentage or multiple of the out-ofpocket or medical expenses for the larger claims.
Even modified no-fault plans will certainly reduce the number of minor claims filed in our courts. But that still leaves the
crux of the problem - those personal injury claims arising out
of automobile accidents when the damage is substantial. At
present, the bulk of these claim disputes involves the question of
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liability.
Improved administrative techniques implemented
through court rule may be able to screen out the more frivolous
claims, but these matters are better settled on a first-party compensation basis which obviates the liability dispute. Any question as to the amount of payment could then be handled by the
courts on a contract rather than on a tort basis. The courts
would then be relieved of the greatest portion of these lawsuits
and the victim would be better compensated on a timely basis
and at a reduced cost to insurers, to policy holders and to the
tax-paying public.
The time has come for new and bold measures to compensate
automobile accident victims which allow the courts to more effectively serve the public. Perhaps, the result of the patchwork
state reform labeled "no-fault" will be federal legislation.
Americans are a very mobile people. Interstate highway
travel is commonplace on a daily basis. Americans change residences frequently from state to state. Congress has seen fit to
legislate certain minimum highway safety standards to minimize
the risks of driving. Surely then Congress has the authority to
set down minimum standards of no-fault compensation for accident victims to mitigate the harsh consequences of accidents that
do occur. In such a way, not only can we replace the present
system of compensation which fails to serve the ends for which
it was created, but we can also redirect the court's attentions and
resources to the disposition of litigation more vital to our liberties.
CBA Proposed "No-Fault" Bill
ARTICLE XXXV
ILLINOIS INSURANCE CODE
An Act to add Article XXXV to the "Illinois Insurance Code,"
approved June 29, 1937, as amended, and to repeal Section 134a
of said Code.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois as follows:
ARTICLE XXXV: COMPENSATION
OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT VICTIMS
INDEX
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Legislative goals
Definitions
Certification of financial responsibility
Insurance requirements
Tort limitations
Deduction of certain collateral benefits
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VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
XII.

Fraudulent claim
Prompt payment of benefits
Subrogation and inter-company arbitration
Medical disclosure
Severability
Effective date
Exhibit "A"

SECTION I.

Purposes of the Act.

The purposes of the legislative goals underlying this Article
are as follows:
1. To guarantee first and third-party motor vehicle insurance subject to certain limitations and exceptions.
2. To provide medical and hospital benefits promptly
without regard to fault subject to certain limitations
and exceptions.
3. To reduce congestion and eliminate backlog in the
Circuit Court of Illinois.
SECTION II.

Definitions

As used in this Act 1. The term "motor vehicle" means any vehicle driven or
drawn by electrical or mechanical power which is
manufactured primarily for use on the public streets,
roads, or highways except any vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails.
2. The term "owner" means a person who holds the legal title to a motor vehicle registered in Illinois; except that in a case of a motor vehicle registered in
Illinois which is the subject of a security agreement,
or lease with an option to purchase, with the debtor
or lessor having the right to possession, such term
means the debtor or lessee.
3. The term "insurer" means any person or governmental entity engaged in the business of issuing or delivering motor vehicle insurance policies within the
State of Illinois.
4. The term "occupant" means any person situated
within a motor vehicle whether as a driver or passenger.
5. The term "pedestrian" means any person not situated
within a motor vehicle who is injured as the result
of an accident involving a motor vehicle.
6. The term "self-insurer" with respect to any motor
vehicle means a person who has satisfied the re-
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quirements of Section III of this Act together with
the related provisions cited therein.
The term "operation, maintenance, and use" when
used with respect to a motor vehicle includes loading
or unloading the vehicle but does not include conduct
within the course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining vehicles unless such
conduct occurs outside the premises of such business.
The term "motor vehicle accident" means an accident
arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of
a motor vehicle.
The term "accidental harm" means bodily injury
death, sickness, or disease caused by a motor vehicle
accident while in or upon or entering into or alighting from, or through being struck by a motor vehicle
or object drawn or propelled by a motor vehicle.
The term "death" means accidental harm resulting
in death within one year after a motor vehicle accident.
The term "injury" means accidental harm not resulting in death.
The term "hospital and medical expenses" means all
appropriate and reasonable expenses necessarily incurred for medical, hospital, surgical, professional
nursing, dental, ambulance, prosthetic services, psychiatric services, and physician and occupational
therapy and rehabilitation. The term "hospital and
medical expenses" also means all appropriate and
reasonable expenses necessarily incurred for any nonmedical treatment and care rendered in accordance
with a recognized religious method of healing.
The term "without regard to fault" means irrespective of fault as a cause of injury or death, and without application of the principle of liability based on
negligence.
The term "director" means the Illinois Director of
Insurance.

SECTION III.

Certification of Financial Responsibility

A. After the effective date of this Act, no owner shall register any motor vehicle within this State, nor shall any person
knowingly operate or use a motor vehicle registered in Illinois
within this State unless and until the owner of such motor vehicle has certified to the Secretary of State that such motor
vehicle is insured under a policy of insurance which meets the

1972).

No-Fault and the Courts

requirements of Section IV of this Act, and also complies with
such reasonable rules and regulations as the director may
promulgate, except that an owner may qualify as a self-insurer
provided that such owner offers such security, bond or other evidence of security similar to the insurance provided under Section
IV. See Sec. 3-101 and 7-201 of Chapter 951/2 and Art. XXIXIX, XXII - XXX of Chapter 73 and also duties of Secretary of
State.
B. No owner or other person shall operate a motor vehicle
in this State without carrying with him written evidence that he
has the insurance coverage required by Section IV.
C. Any owner or other person who fails to comply with
subdivision (A) of this section shall be subject to fine of up to
$500 and to imprisonment for a term up to three months.
SECTION IV.

Insurance Requirements

A. Each policy of motor vehicle insurance issued in the
State of Illinois must be issued by a company approved by the
director to do business in Illinois and in a form approved by him,
and each such policy must contain the following provisions:
1. Provide for payment to the owner, occupant, or
pedestrian without regard to fault of certain losses
which are enumerated below resulting from any
*:
motor vehicle accident occurring anywhere within
the United States, its possessions and territories, and
Canada, and arising out of the operation, maintenance, and use of a motor vehicle.
2. Provide for prompt payment to the owner, occupant,
or pedestrian of all his reasonable and necessary hospital and medical expenses up to the sum of $2,000
per person.
3. Provide for prompt payment to the owner, occupant,
or pedestrian of all lost salary, wages, and income up
to $7,500 per person at the rate of no more than
$150 per week, or 85% of such lost salary, wages,
and income, whichever is smaller.
4. Provide for prompt payment to the owner for the
reasonable and necessary cost of any repair, replacement and loss of use of the registered motor
vehicle.
5. If such owner, occupant, or pedestrian dies within one
year of the motor vehicle accident, provide for the
prompt payment to a surviving spouse, or, in the
event there is no surviving spouse, to surviving children depending on the decedent for support, of a
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survivor's benefit equal to 85% of the average
weekly income the deceased earned during the 52week period immediately preceding the accident subject to a limit of $150 per week for a period of 260
weeks. Payments to a surviving spouse may be
terminated in the event such surviving spouse dies
leaving no surviving children or remarries.
6. Provide for prompt payment to the estate of the
owner, occupant, or pedestrian who dies within one
year of the accident of funeral expenses in an amount
not to exceed $1,000.
B. Every such policy of insurance shall also contain the
following coverages:
1. Bodily injury liability coverage in an amount not
less than $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident.
2. Property damage coverage in an amount not less than

$5,000.
3. Uninsured motorists' coverage in an amount not less
than $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident.
C. Every such policy of insurance may offer higher limits
and additional coverages to such owners of motor vehicles.
D. Every such policy of insurance to be purchased by every
owner of a motor vehicle registered in Illinois must provide that
it is noncancellable for a period of three years from the date of
its issuance providing the policyholder continues to have a valid
driving permit and pays his required insurance premiums when
due.
E. Any such policy of insurance may provide that no benefits will be payable to any injured person covered under the policy
where such injured person's conduct contributed to the injury
in any of the following ways:
1. intentionally causing injury to himself;
2. while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
narcotic drugs;
3. operating a motor vehicle while his license is suspended or revoked;
4. operating a motor vehicle upon a bet or wager or in
a race;
5. while seeking to elude lawful apprehension or arrest
by a police officer;
6. while operating or riding in a vehicle known to him
to be stolen;
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7. while in the commission of a felony.
8. The company may provide such other exclusions as
may be approved by the director as consistent with
public policy.
SECTION V.

Tort Limitation

No action arising out of the operation, maintenance or use
of a motor vehicle within this State may be commenced by a
person seeking damages as a result of bodily injury, sickness or
disease unless the reasonable and necessary hospital and medical
expenses reasonably required to treat such injury, sickness or
disease is determined to be in excess of three hundred dollars,
said sum of three hundred dollars being measured in terms of the
average reasonable cost reasonably required in Illinois to treat
an injury, sickness or disease of the type incurred and during the
period involved after elimination of any disparity in such costs
occasioned by geographical differences and/or by excessive or
exhorbitant charges; provided, that if (1) death ensues or (2)
if such injury or disease consists in whole or in part of loss of a
body member or bodily function, or in whole or in part of serious
disfigurement, then an action for tort damages based on fault
will lie.
SECTION VI.

Deduction of Certain Collateral Benefits

The amount of any payments received by any person injured
in a motor vehicle accident from Workmen's Compensation, as
disability payments under social security, or from medicare shall
be deducted from any first-party benefits that may be payable to
such person under Section IV A and C hereof.
SECTION VII.

Fraudulent Claim

In any claim or action arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, any person who directly or indirectly (1) obtains or attempts to obtain, from any other person
or any insurance company in the State, either as policyholder or
a claimant, any money or other thing of value by falsely or
fraudulently representing that such person is injured or has
sustained an injury or damage to property, for which money may
be paid by way of compensation for medical expenses incurred,
wage loss sustained, or damages determined to be due as pain,
suffering, inconvenience or damages of the same or similar nature or damages to such property, or (2) makes any statement,
produces any document or writing or in any other way presents
evidence for the purpose of falsely and fraudulently representing
any injury or damage to property or exaggerating the nature and
extent of such injury or damage, or (3) cooperates, conspires or
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otherwise acts in concert with persons seeking to falsely and
fraudulently represent an injury or damage to property or exaggerate the nature and extent of such injury or damage to
property, may, upon conviction, if the sum so obtained or attempted to be obtained is less than $100, be fined not more than
$500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the penitentiary for not more than three months, or both. If the sum so
obtained or attempted to be obtained is $100 or more, such person may, upon conviction, be fined not less than an amount equal
to 3 times the sum or sums so obtained or attempted to be obtained or imprisoned for not more than three months, or both.
SECTION VIII. Prompt Payment of Benefits
A. Payment of the benefits set forth under Section IV of
this Article must be made promptly after valid proof of loss has
been submitted to the company. The existence of a potential
cause of action in tort by any recipient of the benefits prescribed
in this Article does not obviate the company's obligation to
promptly pay such benefits.
B. Payments under the coverages provided under Section
IV of this Article must be made periodically on a monthly basis
as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are overdue
if not paid within 30 days after the company has received reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during
that period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire
claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not
paid within 30 days after such proof is received by the company.
Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days
after such proof is received by the company. In the event the
company fails to pay such benefits when due, the person entitled
to such benefits may bring an action in contract to recover them.
In the event the company is required by such action to pay any
overdue benefits, the company must, in addition to the benefits
received, be required to pay the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the other party. In the event of a willful refusal of
the company to pay such benefits, the company must pay to the
other party, in addition to other amounts due the other party,
an amount which is three times the amount of unpaid benefits in
controversy in the action.
SECTION IX. Subrogation and Inter-Company Arbitration
A. If an injured person has received first-party benefits
from his insurer as provided aforesaid, he shall promptly repay
to such insurer out of any tort recovery for such injuries a sum
equal to such first-party benefits paid to him and without any
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cost or charge to such insurer. The insurer paying such firstparty benefits shall have a lien on any tort recovery to that extent but it shall not have the right to institute litigation in the
name of its insured against any alleged wrongdoer on account
of such injuries.
B. Every company licensed to write insurance in this State
under Class 2 or Class 3 of Section 4 of this Code, is deemed to
have agreed, as a condition of doing business in this State or
maintaining its license after the effective date of this Article,
that (1) where its insured is or would be held legally liable for
damages or injuries sustained by any person to whom the benefits
provided in Section IV of this Article have been paid by another
company, it will reimburse such other company to the extent
of such benefits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so
recoverable for the types of loss covered by such benefits, or in
excess of the limits of its liability under its policy; or (2) where
its insured is or would be held legally liable for property damages
or destruction sustained by any person to whom payment has
been made by another company, it will reimburse such other
company to the extent of such payment, but not in excess of the
amount of damages so recoverable for the types of loss covered
by such insurance or in excess of the limits of its liability under
its policy; and (3) that the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount thereof must be decided by mandatory,
binding inter-company arbitration procedures approved by the
director.
C. Any evidence or decision in the arbitration proceedings
is privileged and is not admissible in any action at law or in
equity by any party.
SECTION X.

Medical Disclosure

Any person who claims damages for bodily injury, sickness
or disease, arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle, from another person, or benefits therefrom under
an insurance policy must upon request of the defendant or company from whom recovery is sought, submit to physical examination by a physician or physicians selected by the defendant or
company as may reasonably be required and must do all things
reasonably necessary to enable the defendant or company to obtain medical reports and other needed information to assist in
determining the nature and extent of the claimant's injuries and
the medical treatment received by him. If the claimant refuses
to cooperate in responding to requests for examination and information as authorized by this Section, evidence relevant to
such non-cooperation is admissible in any suit filed by the claim-
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ant for such damages, or for benefits under any insurance policy.
A copy of any medical report made of such physical examination
must be forwarded to the person examined.
SECTION XI.

Severability

If any provision of this Article or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity
does not affect other provisions or applications of this Article
which can be given effect without the invalid application or provision, and to this end the provisions of this Article are declared
to be severable.
SECTION XII.

Effective Date

This Amendatory Act of 1972 shall become effective on
January 1, 1973.
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